I NTRODUCTION
Bad boilerplate can shake one's faith in evolution; not only does it not die away, it multiplies. The puzzle is why. Much of boilerplate is ambigu ous or incomprehensible. This alienates consumers and is increasingly punished by courts construing the language against the drafter. There must, therefore, be some hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate. The popular theory is trickery: drafters lure consumers in with promising lan guage that comes to nothing in court. But this trick would require consumers to do three things they do not do-read the language, under stand it, and take comfort in it.
There is a hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate, but the trick lies in the courts, not the consumer. The trick is a private conversation between drafters and courts; excused from the table is the consumer, who could have no fair duty to understand, and so has no duty to read. With the con sumer out of the room, edits and additions to boilerplate are targeted to courts alone. The new language does not need to make sense to a layman.
It does not even need to make sense standing alone; a judge will read the language in the context of precedent, with the aid of briefing.
contract, none will read the case law in which any particular tum of phrase is embedded. Precedents speak to the drafter, not to the reader.
The problem is in fullest bloom in the insurance context. Insurers will cling for decades to language that courts continually declare ambiguous and construe against the insurer. Why, in the face of this history, insurers have chosen not to clarify the language, or to stop using it, courts "cannot con ceive of an answer. '' 3 What the court does not realize is that it has fired its last shot, and the insurer knows it.
Any discussion of insurance law is by necessity a discussion of contract law. Some of the discoveries and conclusions of this piece apply equally well to ordinary contract law, or even serve as a warning about the future of consumer contract law. History suggests that where the subspecialty of in surance doctrine leads, ordinary contract doctrine may follow. Far from being the dull cousin of the contract family, insurance is the odd but brilliant prodigy. The law of insurance often deviates from basic contract law at pre cisely the point where insurance contracts typify the modem consumer contract-boilerplate clauses, little negotiation, written in legalese, and re ceived by the consumer only after the contract has begun.
Insurance is of course more than just the ultimate consumer contract be cause insurance contracts have their own qualities. Nonetheless, if courts view consumer contracts as disreputable, they view insurance contracts as downright seedy. The result is that insurance law is often the crucible in which new legal approaches to protecting the consumer are formed; more aggressive applications of existing doctrine may arise in the insurance con text and return with new vigor when applied to other consumer contracts. 4
I. See, e. g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
The Arizona Supreme Court describes one such example:
Artificial results derived from application of ordinary rules of contract construction to insur ance policies have made courts struggle to find some method of reaching a sensible resolution Courts try to improve the language of insurance policies, as a parent tries to improve a child's behavior, both by punishment and by encourage ment. The fr ustration of courts in this endeavor suggests that they realize their efforts are being wasted. As stated by one court in 1970, and repeated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1997:
Ambiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the favorite tools of the in surance trade in drafting policies. Most are a virtually impenetrable thicket of incomprehensible verbosity. It seems that insurers generally are attempt ing to convince the customer when selling the policy that everything is covered and convince the court when a claim is made that nothing is cov ered. 5
Given how rarely insurance policy language is read, even by sophisti cated commercial policyholders, who mostly rely on a broker's description, it seems unlikely that policy language is meant to convince would-be poli cyholders of broad coverage. In fact, one would expect that an attempt to lure in new policyholders with truly incomprehensible language would fail.
Evidence supports the proposition advanced here, that the insurers' audience from start to finish is the courts, a practice that leaves policyholders by the wayside, and one that courts unwittingly encourage.
The first perverse incentive is one courts cannot control, but it underlies the other three: the sheer act of having interpreted a clause in a way that allows for predictable application in the future adds value to that clause.
With insurance, the value is great enough that this generally makes it more likely, not less, that drafters will retain poor language. With ordinary com mercial contracts, the value of certainty will sometimes outweigh a less than ideal clause content, and sometimes not. But where drafters-such as insur ers--care more that a clause have a fixed meaning than a particular meaning, path dependence can preclude otherwise desirable improvements in the language.
Second, many courts have come to conclude that nondrafters cannot be required to read their contracts. If insurance language is unredeemable, for example, courts should simply protect the "reasonable expectations" of poli cyholders as to the scope of their coverage--confusing contrary policy within the conceptual bounds of treating standardized, formal contracts as if they were tradi tional "agreements," reached by bargaining between the parties. This difficult task is often accomplished by the use of various constructs which enable courts to reach a desired result by giving lip service to traditional contract rules. One of the most prominent of these methods is the well recognized principle of resolving ambiguities against the insurer [otherwise known as contra proferentem]. & lndem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285, 295 (Ind. App. 1997 ) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) ("We conclude that the division of authority on this issue is instructive and is evidence that more than one reasonable interpretation ... is possible."). This con cept was confirmed in Tra velers In demn ity Co. v. Summit Corp. of America, 715 N.E.2d 926, 938 (Ind. App. 1999) and American Home Assurance Co. v. Allen, 814 N.E.2d 662, 668 n.4 (Ind. App. 2004) , in which the court noted: "Even if we were to find that the terms 'related' and 'interrelated' had the same meaning, we observe that division of authority on an issue is instructive and is evi dence that more than one reasonable interpretation of a term is possible." Id. (emphasis added); see also Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P. 2d 388, 394 (Ariz. 1984) (en bane).
9. Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 624 (Md. 1995) ("[I] f other judges have held alternative interpretations of the same language to be reasonable, that certainly lends some credence to the proposition that the language is ambiguous and must be resolved against the drafter."); see also Lefrak Org., Inc. v. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 942 F. Supp. 949, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[T] he range and variety of judicial opinions bolsters the conclusion that the pollution exclusion ... is ambiguous."), quoted app rovingly by Peace v. Nw. Nat'! Ins. Co., 596 N.W . 2d 429, 454 (Wis. 1999 The problem is compounded by the more than legitimate position courts take when organizations, including insurers, continue to use language that causes years of confusion and costly litigation; at some point the "hostile, open, and notorious" use of such difficult language causes it to be "ad versely possessed" by the courts.
11 In short, the user is on notice that courts will construe the language against him. Even those jurisdictions that have not yet ruled on the language, and so do not independently find the language ambiguous, will join other courts in construing the language in favor of the nondrafter. The result, yet again, is that the language has a settled mean ing-not necessarily found in a natural reading of the clause-that is retained, just where the evidence demands redrafting. 1 2
This Article first examines how the drafting process creates a feedback loop that makes existing language more valuable over time. The network effects and path dependency of shared language are more forceful in insur ance than ordinary contract drafting, yet this Article is the first contribution to the subject. Next, the bulk of the Article establishes and analyzes three ways in which courts counterintuitively reinforce the retention of unclear language through the application of interpretative principles. Finally, while the discussion of these perverse incentives is novel, the Conclusion consid ers some rather obvious solutions.
I. THE BIRTH OF BOILERPLATE
The infiltration of lawyers in commercial contract drafting, at least in the United States, has led to more than language recycled by a single entity, it has led to communal boilerplate-fixed language that is common to an industry, or across industries. 1 3 The more widely boilerplate spreads, the more it comes to resemble a public statute instead of a private agreement.
This, in tum, leads to the common law of common boilerplate.
Corbin drew a distinction between the interpretation and the construc tion of contracts. 14 An interpretation of contractual language seeks to find the parties' meaning. A construction of the language determines the legally binding meaning, which could bear a number of different relations to the 11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004) ("adverse possession"); see also 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 29 (2003) . The analogy is inverted because it is the drafter openly and notori ously using the language, but the courts that come to claim possession of it. Purists can base the adverse possession claim in the courts' hostile, open, and notorious interpretation of the language.
12. There is a fifth twist, not examined here, that distorts insurance drafting. In a parallel to statutory interpretation, courts tum on occasion to the drafting and regulatory history of insurance clauses. This history includes internal ISO documents, published bulletins, and representations to state insurance commissioners about the scope and meaning of new clauses. This history is only used if it adds to or changes a court's interpretation, that is, only if it provides meaning not readily accessible in the clause itself. The private conversation between courts and insurers continues.
13. Farnsworth defines "boilerplate" as "standard clauses lifted from other agreements on file or in form books." E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7. 1, at 426 (3d ed. 1999 Moreover, the accumulative process by which boilerplate comes to be boilerplate, discussed in detail below, often leads to language a layman will not understand. At this point, many courts will lose all interest in the project of interpretation, if defined as seeking the meaning the parties ascribe to the language. And who can blame them? The nondrafter either will have as cribed no meaning to the inchoate language or will have been misled or confused by it. Given that a court cannot simply refuse to address the case in the absence of meaningful interpretation, it is left with construction.
Once it is accepted that boilerplate is not necessarily the will of the par ties, interpretation can be given up in exchange for other values. Contra proferentem 15 attempts to value fairness and future clarity, and, in the insur ance context, the "reasonable expectations" of the policyholder. It has therefore been written of contra proferentem that while "it can scarcely be said to be designed to ascertain the meanings attached by the parties," at least the "rule may encourage care in the drafting of contracts."1 6 This Arti cle suggests otherwise.
The value of uniform interpretation for the same clause across parties mimics the application of statutory law. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(2), "standardized agreements" are "interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the writing."1 7
This rule "subordinates the meaning that an individual party may have at tached to the contract language to the goal of equality of treatment for parties that are similarly situated."1 8 In other words, the language is treated
15.
Contra proferentem as a concept comes first from noninsurance contract law and is de scribed in varying ways. The Supreme Court, applying it in a construction case, referred to "the general maxim that a contract should be construed most strongly against the drafter." United States v. Seckinger, 397 U. S. 203, 210 (1970) . As early as 1923, the Court had applied the rule in the in surance context. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hurni Packing Co., 263 U.S. 167, 174 (1923) ("The rule is settled that in case of ambiguity that construction of the policy will be adopted which is most favorable to the insured."); see also infra note 64. what the language means in the eyes of the law.
For the first nondrafter or consumer before the court, the application of contra proferentem is a boon, assuming that the drafter's interpretation was rej ected by the court in part to protect the consumer. But if the court's con struction of the language is acceptable to the drafter, it will be used in the future, to the disadvantage of consumers two through two million, who will not understand the language or who will be misled by it into not seeking relief a court would grant. In short, the language takes on a private meaning, not between the two parties to the contract, but between the courts and the sophisticated drafter.
Of all contracts, the insurance policy is the poster child for the down sides of boilerplate. Yet the doctrine and interpretive approaches applied to insurance are more strict or more consistently applied versions of those ap plied to other contracts. The assumption has been that courts are stricter with insurance contracts because insurers are incorrigibly bad drafters. It is worth asking if there is not some reverse causation; insurers have become the drafters they are under this stricter interpretive regime.
19.
See, e. g., Carroll v. Littleford, 170 S.E.2d 402, 405 (Ga. 1966) ("[T]he construction placed ... upon similar contracts will control.").
20. Boilerplate language that has a meaning apparent to drafter and nondrafter alike, and that a court is willing to enforce, does not concern us here.
21. E.g. , Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § l (2000).
22. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I. 28. With traditional network effects, the counterpart. to this point is sometimes referred to as critical mass: the point at which the value of joining the network exceeds the cost because of the positive externalities generated by those already on the network. 29. These effects are "gestalt" in the sense that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. A brief primer on insurance drafting: The primary organization in charge of the drafting process is the Insurance Services Office, or IS0.
Drafters do not have to be in litigation to

II. THE F EEDBACK L OOP JN P OLICY D RAFTING
3 1 ISO copy rights standard policy forms and sells access to them. In addition to drafting, ISO submits proposed language to state insurance commissioners and works with the commissioners, sometimes collectively, until the language is ap proved for use. 32 As loss data on the language comes back, and as courts interpret the language, ISO may start the cycle again with redrafting. 3 3 The result, says ISO, is that consumers "benefit from the clarity that the standard coverage language achieves." 34
It should be questioned both whether language does indeed evolve from less to more clear and who benefits from the language changes that are made. ISO boasts that it "monitors changes in the insurance industry and in the law," and then "drafts language necessary to address new laws, court interpretations of coverage forms, or changed market conditions." 35 But re drafts often carry the baggage of their past with them, so that for the cognoscenti, the language has contextualized meaning. This richer meaning is a form of greater clarity for courts and for insurers, but not necessarily for policyholders.
Courts and academics are overlooking the fundamental ways in which insurance drafting differs from ordinary contract drafting, even sophisticated commercial drafting. The structure of collective drafting and data pooling creates network effects and path dependence. The system is inherently self reinforcing, but the strength of the reinforcement depends on the value of known language relative to the value of redrafted language. Doctrines of 31. ISO formed in 1971 through the merger of similar entities for stock insurance companies (the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, later the Insurance Rating Bureau) and mutual in surance companies (the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau), both of which had been drafting policy language for the entire industry since the early 1940s. ISO bills itself as "the property/casualty in surance industry's leading supplier of statistical, actuarial, underwriting, and claims data." ISO Home Page, http://www.iso.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). ISO should not be confused with ISO, the International Organization for Standardization. See Int'! Org. for Standardization Home Page, http://www.iso.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
The role of insurance commissioners is significant:
States have the principal regulatory authority over the primary insurance companies [and e]ach state has an insurance offi cial who has two primary areas of responsibility: (I) monitoring and overseeing the financial solvency of the insurers, and (2) examining insurers' rates and market practices. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), through its advisory recommendations, plays a key role in state regulators' efforts to coordinate and strengthen their oversight of the insurance industry.
PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (Howard Kunreuther
Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., 1998) (citation omitted).
33. Standardized policies do include "manuscript" terms, terms that are drafted for a particu lar policy. Even here, however, any given manuscript term is likely based on a common form of that term. The existence of a manuscript term may indicate more individualized bargaining over that particular term, such that negotiation history might prove useful, but it does not necessarily make interpretation of the term any less "public" than standard ISO terms. MARKETS (1999) , re printed in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 33 (3d ed. 2000).
INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., ISO: ENHANCING COMPETITION IN THE WORLD'S INSURANCE
35.
ABRAHAM, supra note 34, at 34.
interpretation that increase the value of known language or increase the risk of new language strengthen the loop.
In the ordinary contract setting, Kahan and Klausner reserve the term "network benefits" for those externalities that are dependent upon an exist ing network but not a past network, and use "learning benefits" for those externalities that are dependent upon the past common use but not a future one. 36 Learning benefits in ordinary contracts can stem from language that has become familiar through use, whether or not the language continues to be popular. 37 Just so in insurance, but the learning carries more weight in two ways.
First, whether wisdom or paranoia, insurers assume that new language will be systematically construed against their interests. The value of "learn ing," therefore, is higher relative to the dim alternative for insurers. Second, insurers are learning on two fronts. In addition to the language taking on a shared industry meaning, it takes on judicial meaning, and then actuarial meaning.
Note that the network value of judicial knowledge is separate from that of actuarial knowledge. There is a value to many insurers being on the same "language network," in that the language will more quickly be interpreted by each jurisdiction, and without most insurers having to engage in litiga tion. As with statutes, but unlike many contracts, a court's interpretation of policy language holds for all those "governed" by the language. "The inter pretation of policy terms is generalized beyond the claims of a single insured to the entire market for that policy." 38 This is a direct network effect until the terms are well settled, and then it becomes a learning benefit, in that others do not need to continue using the language going forward.
The value of actuarial data, by contrast, includes an ongoing network ef fect, which would be lost if others dropped off the chain. The size, scope, and frequency of losses change over time; without the ability to continually pool loss data with others hooked into the same network, past actuarial data loses its value. Insurers find themselves locked into existing language be cause they must stay in the feedback loop to retain that value. Without the collective endeavor, the rating services (i.e., price setting) of ISO become useless.
Of course, the collective gain from pooling loss data can be had with new language. The value of new language is enhanced by the network bene fit of collecting actuarial data, even if the learning benefit of court interpretation has yet to be reached. However, until the language has been interpreted, the actuarial data will have limited value; the question is not simply how many fires there are in a year, for example, but how many are Although large sums of money are at stake in the initial decisions, pro spectively the answer doesn't much matter. Either computer files are property, in which case insurers can include the risk in the premium, or files aren't property, in which case insurers will exclude the risk from the pre mium. Similarly, although with more difficulty, if electronic data is "tangible property" according to case law, insurers can rewrite the definition of "property" or explicitly exclude electronic data from coverage, perhaps selling separate electronic coverage. Once the language has been given meaning by the courts, even if it continues to confuse policyholders, the insurer's path is set.
It should be noted that although insurers may be indifferent, something is lost when restricted coverage is interpreted more expansively. In extreme cases, insurers will find the expanded coverage untenable and drop the area of coverage altogether. Policyholders might prefer a world in which they can choose between buying ordinary property coverage, or, for more money, adding electronic property coverage. If, on the other hand, policyholders always assume that electronic data will be covered, courts may be right that these expectations can be met only by preventing insurers from selling the lesser coverage.
39. On the other hand, it might be that insurers experience a strong learning benefit from judicial and actuarial experience, but not the usual benefit of a shared understanding between the contracting parties themselves. If this Article is correct that insurers either choose or are trained to ignore the policyholder when drafting, then shared understanding between the two contracting par ties is unlikely and insignificant. A ... critically important benefit of standardized formulations is the reliability that results from the process of 'recognition.' A term is recognized when it is identified through adjudica tion or statutory interpretation and blessed with an official meaning. Informal or 'unofficial' customary term5 may be well-tested and clearly communicative between parties to the transac tion and nonetheless be subject to the prospect of misinterpretation by the state.
Id. at 288.
46.
Even if insurers could write so clearly that policyholders and insurers had a shared un derstanding of the language, an omniscient court could not remove the risk of interpreting the language in new, unexpected contexts. New circumstances arise that neither party anticipated but that existing policy language might cover. No amount of careful drafting can answer these questions in advance, although redrafting as facts gradually change could. For example, why did insurers not write language anticipating the loss of computer data by the 1980s, if not much earlier? This Article provides a partial answer.
47.
With apologies to THE EAGLES, Hotel California, on HOTEL CALIFORNIA (Elek tra/Asylum Records 1976).
in status quo bias here, but that can be saved for later.
48 Even without such bias, it would be accurate for insurers to realize that there are large costs incurred in organizing the industry through groups like ISO, reaching agreement on new language, implementing the language in future policies, and educating policyholders about the change. Abandoning the value of a known interpretation should be added to these costs.
III. P ERVERSE I NCENTIVES
The pitfalls of communal drafting are most dramatic with insurance specific examples, although much of the analysis holds true in a less striking form for all boilerplate. Courts seemingly fa il to see how their directives interact with the structure of the insurance-draft ing process in particular and the choice of boilerplate in general. As a result, courts either fail to see the weakness of interpretive incentives, or they actively provide incentives to retain murky language. Three of these missteps are identified and explored here.
A. An Interpreted Clause ls a Good Clause
As the path-dependency discussion reveals, an interpreted clause is a valuable, predictable clause. With a settled contract term in the hand, even well-drafted new language is in the bush, because "the change itself weak ens the relevance of the existing stock of dispute-resolving conventions that the traditional language invoked." 49 Ordinary contract drafters thus become attached to clauses that both parties can agree upon and that consistently convey the intended mean ing to the court.
With insurance, however, every settled clause has value. 5° First, a clause that confuses or misleads policyholders can still serve an insurer's purpose if courts understand it. This is possible because a side effect of collective drafting is the lack of competition on policy language. As a former president of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, or NAIC, testi 
49.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 44, at 30 1.
50. Well, almost every clause has value; those that require an insurer to provide coverage for a risk it deems uninsurable will be removed from future policies. A war exclusion that removed from coverage the losses of war, for example, would be changed or removed if courts consistently read it to require terrorism coverage. See Boardman, supra note 10.
51. The NAIC is first and foremost the national group for the state insurance commission ers-the people responsible for regulating insurance in each state. Its connections with the industry are both incestuous and adversarial. 53 This proposition needs to be tested empirically.
In lines such as life insurance, insurers do not need to pool loss data because the data is straightforward and available without collaboration. Clauses and policies still tend to converge on similar language, and perhaps it is easier for policyholders to compare both price and substance where one basic risk is insured. 54
Whether insurers are right about policyholders' preferences for price competition over substance competition, collective drafting makes some forms of insurance possible.
If each carrier's loss experience were derived from different policy lan guage, the statistics collected by the rating bureaus could never serve as the basis for loss prediction and rate-setting. Similarly, if individual carriers applied standard-form language differently, their loss experience data would be useless to the rating bureaus. 55
At the heart of this ability to pool individual insurer's data is the courts' willingness to grant standard policy language the universal power of a stat ute.
A final way in which insurance drafting calcifies around a court's inter pretation, any interpretation, is the insurers' willingness to accept an adverse interpretation, changing premiums in lieu of changing the language. This is unlikely to be the case in ordinary contract drafting; if a term is consistently misinterpreted by courts, drafters will stop using the clause. But as with "property damage" to "electronic data," insurers may prefer a court's known interpretation to the insurer's original intended meaning. 
54.
In addition to insuring against the risk that an income-earner will die young, life insur ance policies commonly include an investment component. Investment options differ more widely but still allow for competition on both price and substance.
55.
court to do? Unlike the next two contributions to calcified language, courts may be innocent parties in this debacle. The industry places great value, efficiently and not, on language that has been reliably interpreted by courts.
The two obvious "fixes" are for courts to begin interpreting erratically or to refuse to interpret deficient language at all. Neither is tenable. Next best, understanding the self-reinforcing nature of insurance drafting might help relieve courts of the resentment that insurers willfully ignore their direc tives; in fact, insurers seem to deaf to all others.
B. Drafters Wi ll Write Only to Th ose Who Read
The reasonable expectations doctrine belittles the role of the written contract, thereby encouraging drafters to ignore it. In some courts, the focus on reasonable expectations began as a limitation on the power of contra pro fe rentem.
56 One given purpose of the reasonable expectations doctrine is to create "incentives for insurers to clarify language." 57 If only the language could be made clear enough, the contrary expectations of a policyholder would be deemed unreasonable. But in some jurisdictions the doctrine "applies to all insurance contracts" because "insurance policies are weighted with such a prolixity of complex verbiage that they would not be understood" and, if read, would present "an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confu sion." 5 8 Here, the incentive fails because of the unrebuttable presumption 56.
The doctrine was first fully crafted by Robert E. Keeton in his seminal article, Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Va riance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970) . Keeton recognized an existing judicial behavior and molded it into a single coherent theory, but the behavior he observed was not uniform at the time and has not become uniform since. (1873)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Indeed, the court seems to think insurance scholars are engaged in a form of extreme scholarship. In its view, because insur ers are afraid:
that, notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, some extremely eccentric person might attempt to examine and understand the meaning of the involved and intricate net in [Vol. 104: 1105 that insurance language is unreadable; once the application of the doctrine is divorced entirely from the policy language, the insurer has no incentive to make it clear, as no level of clarity would help.
For courts that take this position, the "duty to read" either does not arise or is a weak one.
59 This is so for one or several reasons: the policyholder does not receive the actual language until after the policy has been issued; 60 the insurer knows the policyholder does not read the policy when he re ceives it and therefore cannot rely on his having read it; 6 1 or the policyholder could not, or does not, understand the language in those rare cases where it is read. In this last case, courts are unwilling to charge policyholders with a "duty to understand" the policy because it is not their fault that the policy is incomprehensible, and if there is no duty to understand the written words, it would be silly to enforce a duty to read.
In its more extreme form, the doctrine allows courts to refuse to enforce policy language that is out of keeping with the policyholder's "reasonable
expectations" of what the policy would cover, even if reading the policy would be sufficient to disabuse the policyholder of his expectation. As one state supreme court explained, "[i]f a policy is so constructed that a reason able man in the position of the insured would not attempt to read it, the insured's reasonable expectations will not be delimited by the policy lan guage, regardless of the clarity of one particular phrase among the Augean stable of print." 62 In this scenario, insurers will aim to make policy language clear to the judge who will interpret it, not to the policyholder who is ex cused from reading it. 63
which he was to be entangled, it was printed in such small type, and in lines so long and crowded, that the perusal of it was made physically difficult, painful, and injurious. Keene, 898 F. 2d 265, 270-72 (1st Cir. 1990 ) (applying New Hampshire law).
63. In such cases, the courts seem concerned only with the representations of the insurer. But the policyholder makes representations too: that he understands the nature of the coverage being purchased. If the policyholder's expectations are wildly out of sync with the actuarial underpinnings of what the policy will pay out and what the policy must first take in by premium, perhaps the poli cyholder should be estopped from insisting on his view of coverage. Should IBM, for example, not be charged with having read its policy?
The doctrine of contra proferentem has an appealing principal ration ale.
64 As the party in control of the drafting process, "it is incumbent upon the dominant party to make terms clear." 65 If the drafter fails in its charge, ambiguous language will be construed against the drafter, in keeping with the reader's reasonable expectations. 66 This provides the drafter an incentive to improve the language and is only fair to the reader, who cannot affect standard-form language. In short, from power comes responsibility: "Con voluted or confusing terms are the problem of the insurer ... not the insured ,, 6 7
Nicely turned out, but not true. Today, the ambiguity problem may be caused by the drafter, but it belongs to the consumer. The consumer is sad dled with the same confusing language time and again, despite the drafter's court-appointed duty. Courts-seemingly unaware of the private nature of their conversation with drafters, insurers in particular-are at wits' end. The
Third Circuit was recently exasperated by a clause that "is widely used in insurance policies and has been the subject of heated litigation throughout the entire country over the past thirty years." 68 The relevant clause reads:
"'Personal injury' means inj ury, other than 'bodily inj ury,' arising out of ...
In some jurisdictions, courts have decided that in order to maintain a uniform interpretation of identical policy language, the interpretation for sophisticated policyholders must match that for unsophisticated ones. Therefore, if an unsophisticated policyholder appears before a court first, the language in that jurisdiction will, for all, be based on the nonreading reasonable expectations. It would seem that insurers have an incentive to take their sophisticated policyholders to court first, in order to lock in a language-based interpretation, and exclude an expectations-based interpretation.
64. Contra proferentem is a basic contract law principle, described in varying ways. See, e.g., 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 32: 12, at 476-8 1 (4th ed. 1993 476-8 1 (4th ed. & Supp. 2005 ) ("Indeed, any contract of adhesion, a contract entered without any meaningful negotiation by a party with inferior bargaining power, is particularly susceptible to the rule that ambiguities will be construed against the drafter."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON TRACTS § 206 (198 1) ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."); UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 4.6 (1994) ("If contract terms supplied by one party are unclear, an interpretation against that party is preferred."); see also 17A AM. JuR. 2D Contracts § 342 (2004) ("An instrument uncertain as to its terms is to be most strongly construed against the party thereto who causes such uncertainty to exist, especially if he or she is the party who drew the contract or selected its language."). C.J .S. expands on the case of selecting language drafted by a third party:
The language of a contract will be construed most strictly or strongly against the party respon sible for its use, whether that party or his or her representative chose the language or prepared the contract. A party is responsible for language used by his or her attorney in drafting a con tract [as well]. [t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or le ssor." 69
As potential ambiguities spring to mind, bear in mind that in order to apply contra proferentem, the language must be ambiguous "as applied" to the factual case at hand. Here, the policyholder was a Delaware county that had quashed the plans of a developer, who then promptly sued for the taking of property without due process of law and for equal protection violations. 70
The county claimed that the insurer should provide cove rage.
The policyholder's first winning position was that "invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises" was ambiguous enough to allow a reasonable interpretation encompassing rezoning and building permit denial. The court's conclusion that the language was am biguous is supportable; the conclusion that the language was ambiguous as applied is not.
Ambiguous by Consensus
To support its conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on the fact that other courts had found the language ambiguous. 7 1 Some courts explicitly state that insurers should be held to the interpretation most favorable to the policy holder where there are known splits because the insurer has failed in its job of rewriting language it knows causes confusion. 72 Other courts hold more simply that such splits are evidence of ambiguity and resolve the ambiguity against the insurer. 73
A minority of courts has found "invasion of private right" ambiguous, a majority has found it unambiguously excludes regulatory decisions, and none has found it unambiguously includes regulatory decisions. From this, the Third Circuit, among others, concluded that the language must be am biguous. In an earlier case, the Third Circuit had held that " [t] 73. See New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 756 ("A single phrase, which insurance companies have consistently refused to define, and that has generated literally hundreds of lawsuits, with widely varying results, cannot, under our application of commonsense, be termed unambiguous.").
almost identical policy provisions, itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation," and is therefore ambiguous. 7 4
The perverse incentive of abdicating the ambiguity decision to other courts is apparent. The somewhat random result is that whether a term is considered ambiguous or not in a given jurisdiction may turn on the order of decisions.
Th e Adverse Possession of Language
The second winning position for the "takings" policyholder was that in surers were on notice that the language was unacceptable. & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d 393, 400--0 1 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) . There the court noted:
Surely we would be abdicating our judicial role were we to decide such [ambiguity] cases by the purely mechanical process of searching the nation's courts to ascertain if there are conflict ing decisions. . . . [W] hether other courts have reached varying conclusions regarding the meaning of a policy is only relevant where the various meanings ascribed are reasonable.
Id. The court then decided that the other courts "have ascribed an unreasonable meaning to an un ambiguous provision." Id. After this 1989 rejection of Cohen, a 1981 case, a panel of the court reverted in 1995, see Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) ("More important than the actual holdings by other courts is the fact that their decisions dem onstrate the existence of an ambiguity in the crucial term .... "), only to again reject the practice in 1996, see Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 802, 807 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) ("Rather than relying on the fact that jurisdictions are split over construing the provisions or that one jurisdictional line of reasoning is better than another, courts must remember to invoke the basic tenet of contract law and look to the writing itself first, before otherwise deciding a policy is ambiguous."). 77. New Castle County , 243 F.3d at 755 (quoting lower court disposition).
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Michigan La w Review [Vol. !04: 1105 have still not settled on a common meaning, insurers know that a decent percentage will find the language ambiguous. Given this, courts take the position that ongoing use of such open and notoriously difficult language will be declared "adversely possessed" by the courts; its meaning may once have belonged to the drafter, but now it is as the courts say. 78
As to why, in the face of this history, insurers had chosen not to clarify the language, or to stop using it, the court admitted that it "cannot conceive of an answer." 79 What the court does not realize is that it has fired its last shot, and the insurer knows it. The threat of construing language against the insurer is mainly in the surprise; the insurer collected premium X but finds it owes coverage X + Y. The next year the insurer collects premium X + Y, or some calculation thereof, discounting (perhaps) for those policyholders who won't seek Y coverage from X language.
8 0 One would think that this calcula tion would become complicated where one-third of the states choose X, one-third choose X + Y, and one-third has yet to rule. Courts are not the only ones stymied that insurers retain the language despite this morass, but con sider the insurer's options.
In two-thirds of the jurisdictions, the language has a settled valuable meaning: X in one-third, X + Y in one-third. In the remaining one-third, insurers can guess that more than half will take the jurisdictional split as proof of ambiguity and find X + Y coverage. A settled meaning can there fore be expected in five-sixths of the jurisdictions. In any event, the insurer knows the exact application of the clause (for the disputed facts) in the great majority of jurisdictions; why would it redraft the language now?
We might suspect that insurers would object to the untidy patchwork of interpretations. To get uniform results, the insurer has two options. First, it could introduce new language in every jurisdiction, but this opens it up to a whole new round of the game, without the current interpretation-security found in over two-thirds of cases. Second, it could introduce new language in the X + Y jurisdictions only, aiming to re turn to the category of X cover age. This choice only makes sense if uniform coverage from varied language is better than varied coverage from uniform language.
Of course, this analysis leaves out a central incentive for insurers-the cost of litigation. Under the current regime, the insurer can handle claims and settlements in at least two-thirds of cases (assuming equal distribution of cases across jurisdictions) without much need for litigation, at least not language-based litigation. The insurer knows how courts will interpret the language without going to court again, and the policyholder, even if con fused about the language beforehand, can discover its meaning after the loss. If new language is introduced, however, even relatively clear language,
78. See supra note 11.
79.
New Castle County, 243 F.3d at 755.
80.
See infra text accompanying note 87, discussing unsophisticated or ill-advised policy holders who do not know to seek coverage because the policy language does not reveal that courts have found coverage. it likely will be litigated in every jurisdiction until a settled meaning is fou nd. This insurers do not want to do.
Finally, some argue that contra proferentem should apply equally to un sophisticated and sophisticated parties, in order to maintain a uniform interpretation of the same policy language.
81 As the Supreme Court of Wash ington reasoned:
This standard form policy has been issued to big and small businesses throughout the state. Therefore it would be incongruous for the court to apply different rules of construction based on the policyholder because once the court construes the standard form coverage clause as a matter of law, the court's construction will bind policyholders throughout the state regardless of the size of their business. 82
This seems to mean that even if a policyholder could show good reason why it understood the language at hand to have a different meaning, and the specific insurer either shared that meaning at the time (contrary, let us as sume, to the drafters and the current precedent) or had reason to know of the policyholder's understanding yet did nothing to fix it, the court should re frain from enforcing the parties' joint intent.
This may be one of the strangest aspects of the statutory nature of boi lerplate clauses; as with legislation, but unlike most contracts, a court 's interpretation of policy language holds for all those "governed" by the lan guage. The industry seems to recognize the statutory nature of insurance clause interpretation: What has escaped notice, and therefore scrutiny, is the fact that this ad ditional meaning is semi-private-the result of an ongoing conversation between insurers and courts-of which policyholders may be unaware. Of course, the meaning is public in that judicial opinions are public, but the public nature of Supreme Court opinions has not brought constitutional un derstanding to the streets. There is a difference between missing the basket and making a foul: the lack of efficient evolution in interpretive rules is a missed opportunity, but more, the intentional pursuit of efficiency by courts has resulted in actively perverse incentives in the drafting of policies.
The first outcome no doubt has many causes, but to the extent courts de fer to one another's ambiguity rulings, competitive evolutionary pressures are relieved. The second outcome-perverse incentives to retain poor lan guage-stems from the communal structure of boilerplate evolution, and the collaborative structure of the insurance market. This structure, while perhaps inevitable and perhaps desirable, limits competition on the policy front, shifting competition to price, package, and service. 85 The key, however, is knowing that the opinions should be read-knowing that a particular turn of phrase in a clause refers to the judicial interpretation of a prior clause. This sotto voce command to the courts can result in concealed meaning, or in language that Goetz and Scott call "encrusted." 86
Notice that if the incentive given to insurers is to retain language that has increased in certainty value by interpretation, courts seem to assume that all future policyholders will be helped nonetheless. Those that go to court will, and perhaps that is all some courts can see. The remaining policyhold ers are harmed. Those who do not sue because they do not read the hidden text into the unclear or misleading calcified language are not aided by the fact that, had they sued, coverage would be found. Moreover, these policy holders pay the increased premium for the judicially interpreted clause but only demand coverage for the clause as written.
87 In short, the less sophisti cated the policyholder, the greater the risk of harm-again, an outcome opposite courts' intentions.
This Article uncovers numerous difficulties but points to one fairly obvi ous solution: courts should be schooled in the nature of boilerplate creation, including insurance drafting, and be wary of creating perverse incentives to retain the very clauses they seek to change. As the trend in ordinary contract interpretation parallels more closely that already taken with insurance con tracts, courts should be aware of the consequences.
Specifically, while the reasonable expectations doctrine has an estab lished place, its application should not be completely divorced from contract language, or drafters will likewise divorce themselves from improving the language. Moreover, compulsive application of contra pro ferentem to clauses that are not ambiguous, but rather simply disputed, can also belittle the role of language; to give drafters (and particularly, insurers) an incentive to fix language, language must carry weight with the court.
As for insurers, one might wonder why the onus for change is not laid at their own feet. First, the thrust of this Article is that courts have one aim but unintentionally encourage another, often contrary, re sult. What is called for is a better understanding of the process, not a more illusive change in moti vation or appeal to the altruistic side of insurers. Second, to the extent insurers already have a motivation to improve poor language, that motiva tion might be unleashed if courts were to stop raising unnecessary hurdles.
Ending inartful overapplication of the reasonable expectation doctrine, for example, could have substantial effect.
Similarly, those who believe in the strong incentives of the market sys tem should be skeptical about what seems to be a failure of individual insurers to grab the low-hanging fr uit. Of course, again, this Article argues that insurers are constrained by their collective endeavor in a way evident in few other industries. In addition, it is not obvious that insurers aren't rela tively content with the current system; the fru stration of misconstrued language might be outweighed by the importance of predictable language.
As long as insurers expect courts to systematically rule against them at every margin, insurers may value nothing so highly as the ability to nail courts down through precedent.
Conversations with industry insiders suggest that the "insurance crowd"
has internal rules about the way in which policies should be written, and perhaps this prevents the kind of innovative policy writing market forces faster, but no one company will suffer relative to the others for the lan guage's failings. 90 If, however, an insurer strikes out on its own, this innovation brings the fu ll cost of gathering actuarial data and the lonely danger of the language leading to unexpected liability.
The industry that drafts together, sticks together, not just for fu ture draft ing, but for the pooling of loss data that comes in on the first draft. From insurers, therefore, improvement will lie not in more individualized innova tion, but in more industrywide redrafting. What should be discarded in the end is not the standardized policy supported by mass actuarial data, but those interpretive rules that create perverse incentives to retain weak lan guage and create secret meaning.
88.
In THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, James Surowiecki attempts to explain the type of situation where competitors are all too cautious when they each have an incentive to buck the received wis dom. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004 347, 355-56 (1996) .
90.
This is an inexact generalization, of course. Some insurers will sell policies with the new language more broadly than others, thereby bearing more risk should the language implode. Simi larly, based on their other risks and investments, insurers vary in their ability to take large losses.
